President Nixon with Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghand November 4, 1971. (Richard Nixon Presidential Library)
Luke Nichter is Professor of History at Texas A&M in Central Texas
With this Nixon Now Podcast, we're speaking about Nixon tapes again focusing particularly on President Nixon's discussions on the Indian War with Pakistan in 1971 and on the international and home implications of US politics for conflict. Our visitor is Luke Nichter, Professor of Historical past at Texas A&M University. He’s the nation's most necessary professional on the Nixon White House strips and founder of NixonTapes.org.
Jonathan Movroydis: Welcome to Nixon Now Podcast. I'm Jonathan Movroydis. Nixon Foundation brings you this. We send Richard Nixon from the Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, California. You’ll be able to comply with us on Twitter @nixonfoundation or at nixonfoundation.org. At this time, we are talking about Nixon tapes, which focus particularly on President Nixon's discussions on the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971 and the worldwide and home implications of US politics on this conflict. Our guest is Luke Nichter, Professor of History at Texas A&M College, Central Texas. He is the founder of Nixon's White House strips and nixontapes.org. Luke, welcome back.
Luke Nichter: Thank you, Jonathan. It's good to be again.
Jonathan Movroydis: On four November 1971, President Nixon met at the Oval workplace with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. What was their relationship?
Luke Nichter: Nicely, with the word, exhausting. You realize that they both had a particularly troublesome time for an additional, I imply the starting of a potential conflict between India and Pakistan. You had a current Indian cope with the Soviet Union. You had Nixo to get to China and deliberate a visit. They might have recognized one another for a long time. Nixon would have recognized his father, Nehru, the first prime minister of India when he was Eisenhower's vice-president. So even in case you have been a very essential meeting on this time and place, they might have had a for much longer association that led to it.
Jonathan Movroydis: India has grow to be essential to the United States in recent times. President Obama even hosts the first state dinner with India, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. What was the relationship between the United States and India throughout the Nixon era? That is the largest democracy in the world, limiting communist China and Soviet influence in Central Asia.
Luke Nichter: Properly, you realize, in the Nixon era and even a number of years that led to it, I find it troublesome to discover a place in the world that has a extra complicated relationship with the United States and both instructions of relationships. As you stated, India was the world's largest democracy. But you recognize that the struggle was more essential, you understand, formally "non-allied movement" chief. Most nations throughout the Chilly War, either immediately or not directly, took the lead from the US or the Soviet Union. It didn't imply they have been actually unbiased. I feel it’s truthful to argue that India, particularly throughout the Nehru years, would in all probability result in much less capitalism and more to the Soviet system. But this was a sophisticated relationship. America tried to take care of relations with both India and its competitor in Pakistan, who divorced during the struggle in 1947, when the space was released in Britain.
And every time the United States did one thing to India, it had to be sure that it did one thing to Pakistan with out others seeming to have favored one or the other. I mean, it was only a very difficult place, particularly behind the Cold War, on the different aspect of the Himalayan Mountains, with China. It is a very complicated space. And the relationship with the United States is just as complicated.
Jonathan Movroydis: However during the Cold War, why don't they search for nearer ties with the United States because the Soviet Union is near and China is even closer? 19659006] Luke Nichter: Nicely, once more, don't repeat the proven fact that it's difficult, half of our drawback is that we don't perceive as People, very much on the other aspect. This was a spot that was 10,000 miles away, as far as you’ll be able to go round the world. And most of these nations, whether or not China, be it Russia, Pakistan, India, have revealed only a few books for instance their story here.
So we now have to take a look at all the angles on the sidelines, all the sides of the story actually, simply by means of the lens of the newly chosen American report that has been eliminated over the years. But principally India and China have been thought-about rivals. They have been principally in struggle with each other in 1962. And on Kennedy's ribbons, you got in India at an oval workplace where he asked President Kennedy for missiles and radar shields and actually thought, "This could be a real war." 19659006] You might have a conflict between India and Pakistan, which is the second conflict between two close neighbors and members of the family, Hindu Muslims. On the different hand, the Russians are closer to the Indians than to the Pakistani individuals. There’s also a new competition between Russia and China. You will have several counterweights for the other, which cuts virtually the similar logarithmically, longitudinally. It’s a very complicated separation with all these forces.
Jonathan Movroydis: Listening to the first vote on August 2, 1971. This is President Nixon and his nationwide safety advisor, Henry Kissinger, at the oval workplace. And this is about a couple of months earlier than the Indo-Pakistani warfare actually breaks down. However the first sound clip is played.
Dr. Kissinger: Subsequent yr we really have a report. Every drawback we got here up with has been solved with the exception of the Center East. And it has improved.
President Nixon: Tell me now about Pakistan. I read, I see now, that the Beatles are elevating money for them. You realize, it's a fun factor we’re in this depraved country.
Henry Kissinger: Properly, we’ve got $ 100 million, it depends upon whom the Beatles gather cash, Indian refugees
President Nixon: refugees, yeah. 19659006] Henry Kissinger: Is It India or Pakistan?
President Nixon: The Depraved Indians
Henry Kissinger: The Indian aspect has a financially fine condition. We've given them $ 70 million.
President Nixon: Um-hmm.
Henry Kissinger: Extra is coming, and nobody is aware of how they use wicked cash as a result of –
President Nixon: You're giving it to the authorities?
Henry Kissinger: Yeah.
President Nixon: Properly that's a terrible mistake.
Henry Kissinger: Yeah, they don't let anyone out there. They don’t permit foreigners –
President Nixon: The Indians usually are not?
Henry Kissinger: Refugee Space. No foreigners at all.
President Nixon: Nicely, what about Pakistan?
Henry Kissinger: Properly, on the Pakistani aspect, we have now shifted $ 100 million value of meals in the harbor. We’ve had a working group engaged on it, either in ports or in ports. The large drawback now’s to get it shared. The UN has despatched 38 specialists. They are able to ship 150.
Jonathan Movroydis: Kissinger says this voice at the beginning that they’ve a report subsequent yr, 1972. Each drawback with China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, except perhaps the Center East, has been improved. Nixon translates the conversation to Pakistan. Why is he so fearful about this half of the world at the moment, which doesn't get much care in the research, Nixon's overseas coverage?
Luke Nichter: Nicely, I feel you understand that India's specific drawback of Subcontinence isn’t the other mentioned problems they talked about in the discussion, China, the Soviet Union, or Vietnam, even in the Center East. I feel there is a tendency for it to be inaccurate now and again, not solely throughout the Nixon years, however during the other Presidencies during the Cold War, to see all the issues of the Cold War, which signifies that it’s no less than two major powers. It's for us. It's them. And if we just go down, sit and speak, we will do this.
Subcontinent is totally different. I imply, this can be a place that is 7,000 years previous, it has a really totally different past, history, like this American eurocentric understanding of the world. It’s also a spiritual drawback. It’s a main humanitarian and refugee drawback, given the unimaginable population density, starvation and financial and social issues on the South continent, which I find it obscure for a lot of People and even Westerners. So I feel it's the very first thing I feel Nixon, Kissinger, and many People saw many issues with this cold conflict blind, as a result of this can be a far more difficult state of affairs.
Subcontinent throughout Nixon earlier than and after the yr all the time appears to be a sort of spark away from his next conflict. As I stated, most People are very removed from the world. It's arduous to know. And I feel American leaders, not just Nixon and Kissinger, have been continually struggling to seek out the proper stability when it came to help India and Pakistan and to take care of a relationship with the region, but in addition on each side on their very own phrases in a means that didn't cause problems with others.
Jonathan Movroydis: Nixon and Kissinger in this part, someway humorously, speak about The Beatles, no less than the members of The Beatles. They discuss with eg. Ringo to Starri and companion Billy Preston. We'll be there in a second. However take heed to the second vote on December eight, 1971. This is President Nixon, who speaks together with his secretary-general John Mitchell and Dr. Kissinger in an oval workplace.
President Nixon: Our criticism is completely immoral. First of all, they say they level out that because there are 600 million Indians and only 60 million in West Pakistan, we’re on the mistaken aspect. We ought to be with 600 million Indians. I stated when did we outline the morality of our policy on the basis of how many people are in the country? I stated one more reason they have been incorrect, then they are saying, however India is a democratic country, and Pakistan is a totalitarian country, a dictatorship, and subsequently India, we should not be on the aspect of a dictatorship, but on the aspect of a democratic country. I stated, if a country engages in aggression, it's fallacious. And in a sure sense, it is even mistaken that a democratic country takes it as a result of democratic nations are held with greater morality. And I stated that international morality ends – the United Nations is prepared – for those who take the principle that because the country is democratic and huge, it may do what the hell it needs. I feel this brings the query to those boys' boys
Jonathan Movroydis: Nixon felt the American media and the intellectual class disagree with the rise of America in the direction of Pakistan, as is clear in this recording. In an early voice, we heard the celebrities of fame I had talked about earlier. Is the characterization of Nixon and Kissinger right?
Luke Nichter: Properly, I imply, to some extent. You already know, I'm taking some variety of center method, say, taking notes of President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and other educational works which might be principally crucial to Nixon and Kissinger. second half. I feel they’re two issues.
I feel the first is about objects. I feel India has been capable of make good use of higher optics and branding geopolitically at the second. I imply, whenever you had one nation that referred to as itself the world's largest democracy, which might probably be towards this concept? India was a nation, the land of Mahatma Gandhi. Who might be towards it? Lengthy affiliation with Britain. It's a colony. Indian leaders didn’t use army uniforms, corresponding to dictators who ran in Pakistan.
And so I just assume of optics alone, it was so troublesome to be towards India. So I feel Nixon is talking about this morality. However I feel he’s really frightened that he feels that individuals are civilized with India because they assume they are civilized, while Nixon's frustration is that he doesn’t really feel he is getting credit score for making peace. He thinks he is the one who’s making an attempt to make nice peace with China to stop the Third World War.
And so little in the brief term, he doesn't get credit because he ignores Pakistan, an ally of China, and he feels he's really doing the great seismic work to convey peace. And he doesn’t get credit for it partly because he and the White House, a lot of that is secret, and cannot be publicized, however as a result of I don’t assume public relations on the aspect of Nixon are so
Jonathan Movroydis: This can be a debate about democracy and morality. Nixon and Kissinger have been thought-about real looking in overseas policy. Do you assume this mild displays their common philosophy in overseas coverage?
Luke Nichter: It's an fascinating query. You already know that there will not be many occasions in the tapes whenever you hear Nixon and Kissinger, or in all probability all the realists who spend lots of time talking about moral-like issues. And this is one of the occasions they're doing in lots of locations on tapes. I ponder whether their considerations are actually ethical or whether or not it’s aggression on the aspect of Nixon. I imply, they use the word morality, but I feel that their higher concern is aggression, which can also be the term used by President Nixon in the last clip.
In response to Nixon and Kissinger, it was between India and Pakistan, India is as massive as Pakistan. India is the world's group help. India has signed an settlement with the Soviet Union simply earlier in autumn 1971, despite the fact that it’s "neutral and untied". So in American eyes it isn’t Pakistan, it’s India, which appears to share extra guilt in the direction of aggression in the direction of another. And particularly, and I feel Nixon and Kissinger saw that this aggression was helped by another aggressive drive, the Soviet Union.
So I feel their concern was really aggressive. And once they made their friendly geopolitical stability, but Pakistan also doesn't have a clear document, I feel it was India's largest aggressive factor. And it’s a type of decrease line of Nixon's White House
Jonathan Movroydis: It's fascinating that each one this occurs proper after Nixon proclaims that he was in China in 1972. July 15, Nixon declares. In August, you will notice these celebrities who increase cash for refugees going to India or Pakistan. And then the warfare will escape later that yr. Do these critics of US help to Pakistan have anything to do with aiding Pakistan with another totalitarian state, Communist China?
Luke Nichter: Nicely, I feel there’s an unclear case. It seems that there’s an ambiguous case of India enjoying higher public games here than Pakistan. And now, with out the Indian data open, there isn’t a option to claim that India took the help of a worldwide group, the UN, its businesses, and The Beatles, and even celebrities, to point out some sophistication here. the ratio of its operations. We now have no document collection that I can present that "India did this and did it consciously at the moment."
However truly it seems to be occurring. India is enjoying a really refined recreation of PR. And Pakistan, you recognize, isn’t. And the United States is somewhat tied to the capacity to do anything, as a result of it is nonetheless planning a secret trip to China, which, as you notice, as quickly as Nixon proclaims in mid-July that he intends to go to China, is such a bam, bam, bam, fast successive cascade occasions in a month, this publicity campaign shall be launched. You’ve got Indira Gandhi, who makes a earlier journey to see Nixon at the Indian Summit, then early in the fall, just when the Indians have mentioned with the Russians who led this agreement in mid-August, this Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation agreement that was introduced.
Then you could have a very quick path with Pakistan. And all this occurred. After Nixon's announcement in July, he went to China and plans to journey. And there have to be a clear hyperlink between these occasions.
Jonathan Movroydis: Do you assume the pressure with India brought the Chinese and the United States nearer to each other and helped culminate in this journey in 1972? 19659006] Luke Nichter: For those who take a look at the notes, a dialogue protocol that data the secret conversations between the Kissinger and different People and the Chinese language once they planned the next journey, a couple of more months, India will come here and there, not the means Taiwan does, or Japan, or Vietnam, or Russia. It has a number of levels of which means. But I imply that each side knew that India and China have been near the warfare in the early 1960s. Up to now, these two nice Asian powers, India and China, have very lengthy, enduring and controversial boundaries.
So I imply that each one the cards would have been on the table so far as it goes. Whether or not it has a real position, perhaps a minor position in bringing the United States and China closer, but I feel that at the prime of this listing have to be Russia, Japan, the position of the United States in the Pacific, Vietnam, such considerations.
Jonathan Movroydis: Do you assume there was a battle in any respect when it was dealt with by main communist forces, China-Soviet summits  Luke Nichter: India doesn't come out. Have you learnt that India is fearful about each Chinese language … So now the Soviet Union is nuclear energy. The Chinese language are in all probability nuclear and perhaps not refined, but the Soviet Union helped the program begin in the 50s and even in the 60s before Mao and Zhou Enlai pulled out the Soviet scientists from China. And it actually accelerated the break between the Soviet Union and China.
I'm a bit cynical that at any time at two main powers, who haven’t any different cause to work together, to sign agreements on arms limitations. typically it does not essentially relate to either of these nations however prevents third nations from increasing their packages. And you see this going back to 63 when instantly the Soviet Union is prepared to sign a check ban settlement during the yr of Kennedy. Abruptly they arrive out of something. And even in the Kennedy White House, it’s assumed that, as a result of the real considerations of the Soviet Union the Chinese language develop their own atomic program.
And so you understand that the United States makes these agreements from the Individuals's Republic of China in the 1970s with Moscow in the spring summit, signed by SALT 1, I might have little question that an agreement like SALT 1 has to do quite a bit about the considerations of the United States and the considerations of third events about the Soviet Union, whether it’s China's Indian program, the Pakistan program, the Israeli program. You have got all these nations in the region armed with tooth, and you’d have brought about anyone to worry whenever you see once more, the entire area is a sort of spark out of the nice battle
In October 1967, Nixon wrote his article "Asia After Viet Nam" in a overseas journal, where he sees the future of dynamically altering Asia. Particularly, he says that "the United States should continue to support and support India's economic goals and two, to do its utmost to persuade the Indian government to shift its means and adapt its institutions." He stated: "These goals can be secured faster and more efficiently by drawing lessons from the United States, but also from the more successful neighbors in India, including Pakistan." "An earlier episode of Nixon saying that the United States is a Pacific energy. What do you consider India out of your overseas coverage point of view of President Nixon?
Luke Nichter: That's an enormous query. relations with India, never as detailed, never as weeds, corresponding to those of the US, similar to the Soviet Union, China or Vietnam, or European allies. I don't assume Nixon understood it nicely. I don't assume many People did. he's doing an "external relationship." For my part, these factors categorical the proper coverage, it expresses a stability in the relationship we’re striving for between India and Pakistan. However in the finish I feel I don't understand how much in any era, including Nixon's years, actually has a relationship with India for Indian reasons.
India seems to be in keeping with the definition of the Chilly War. It seems to be outlined by its neighbors. I know that American politics think about Central Asia, South Asia and even East Asia to be a counterweight that I feel we will hope for, because it is such an unknown place where, frankly, we’ve a reasonably current historical past. After the United Kingdom's departure after World War II, when India and South Asia usually are not even on the record, even the bottom of the record of key priorities.
I feel India is a collection… counterbalanced by counterbalance, India as a counterweight to Pakistan, India as a counterweight to China. Together they are in all probability the counterweight to Japan. I consider that protecting the Soviet Union in the area is constructive for the United States. So I feel India, in counterweight, truly surrounds a complete technique because I just don't assume we understand it properly, it's an extended history, even to this present day, to actually get so much of information about India.
Jonathan Movroydis: To return to the home political affect, we play the clip on December 21, 1971, late. This is in an oval office. That is Richard Nixon, Chief of Employees Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman and lawyer John Mitchell.
John Ehrlichman: They have been capable of level out that there was just one place in the federal government, with all
President Nixon: This is here.
John Ehrlichman: And it was here at the Nationwide Security Council Joint Personnel Workplace.
President Nixon: Yeah.
John Ehrlichman: And –
President Nixon: Jesus Christ!
John Ehrlichman: There are solely two men on this workplace. His Admiral [Welander] and Man [Radford]. In order that they started interviewing both, and they both described each. And the Lord was of course a man. He knew Jack Anderson. He had had dinner with Jack Anderson the previous Sunday. His wife and Jack Anderson's spouse have been Mormons and buddies who did issues together and so on and so on. He had been in India for 2 years. He felt strongly about India / Pakistan. So there was motive, opportunity and entry.
President Nixon: Can I ask how we’ve got a man in God's identify who has entry to this sort of doc?
John Ehrlichman: Nicely, he's a key individual. He is the man who writes all the memoirs, the notes of the conversations that collect all –
President Nixon: Does Henry know him?
John Ehrlichman: Everyone is aware of him.
John Mitchell: He traveled with Henry [Kissinger].
John Ehrlichman: He Traveled with the Higger
President Nixon: Did he go to China?
John Ehrlichman: No, however he went –
President Nixon: Indonesia?
John Ehrlichman, Indonesia, where I imply Vietnam with Haig. And did all of Haig's relations [unclear]. So he has been proper in the krux of this matter. Now he’s working for this Admiral in Welander, a joint manager of employees. He was headed by a chief of the navy [Rembrandt Robinson] in the workplace.
President Nixon: I keep in mind him.
John Ehrlichman: This man, when he was polygraphed, was requested, inter alia, if he was ever –
President Nixon: Did you do it with polygraf?
John Ehrlichman: Oh yes. Certainly. And he refused to provide any paperwork to Anderson. However he has admitted one thing else.
President Nixon: Yes.
John Ehrlichman: He understands that he could be the only different authorities than Admiral [Welander] who has entry to all these paperwork. He understands the state of affairs. Says: “It is clear that it is a good and tight thing. I will answer all your questions. ”
Jonathan Movroydis: Ehrlichman mainly mentions two chapters here, Navy Yeoman Charles Radford and editor Jack Anderson. What are they speaking about here? And who are these two males?
Luke Nichter: Nicely, I feel that is one of the most fascinating tales. With Nixon ribbons, throughout the Nixon presidency, I mean it's just all the elements. There's intrigue. It has gossip. It has a coverage. It has leaks to the press. It takes place in a serious struggle between India and Pakistan. Though Nixon could be very a lot on the edge, he doesn't want surprises in current weeks and months before touring to China. And this can be a drawback that we study rather more.
Nixon Library has asked for brand spanking new data last yr or two, 2017, 2018, as individuals talked about by Ehrlichman taped meetings, Charles Radford, Jack Anderson. So Ehrlichman does a reasonably good job of presenting these two guys and the drawback to Nixon. Ehrlichman in these discussions is such that he takes a special tone than he does not have quite a bit of tapes. He's virtually like Nixon's lawyer or he's investigating. And he presents his shopper with information so that they will determine what to do. And so he truly stories properly.
So you’ve got the Yeoman Charles Radford fleet and you could have a well known journalist, Jack Anderson, who was a sort of Drew Pearson protector. Muckraking-shaped columnist from Washington is a "merry-go-round", which is usually the very first thing to be translated every single day in the Washington Publish and syndicated elsewhere, or to get gossip around the metropolis. You realize that you already know that you’ve these two collaborative figures which are making an attempt to steal, leak, publish the Nixon White House for a better understanding of US overseas policy with India and Pakistan throughout this era
Jonathan Movroydis: Why do you assume Yeoman Radford felt so robust about Indo-Pakistani? What was the leakage of documents?
Luke Nichter: This can be a sort of thing that motivates this thing to occur. I don't know greater than what Ehrlichman studies. I feel this is about 20 hours late on this problem ”71. So you have got tons of tapes. And Nixon himself has taken half in most of these discussions in addition to the analysis completed by Ehrlichman on his own and then reporting to Nixon at the Oval Workplace.
What we know what Ehrlichman is ready to perceive is that Radford had made a couple of years at the Indian Embassy in India and had in all probability turn out to be very Indian throughout his time. Ehrlichman assumes that being a Mormon, like Jack Anderson, might have made them extra cooperative. It's unsure. Radford had a family in India. So I feel he had a pure affinity for Indian politics, not that he didn't like Pakistan, but he had only hung out and had private contacts there that Anderson was capable of take benefit of a method or another. 19659006] To seek out out, what Radford had carried out, he obtained access not only to Indian and Pakistani overseas coverage paperwork, but in addition to other Nixon overseas coverage issues. Ja luulen tässä, Nixonin mielessä on hyvin huolissaan erityisesti siitä, että Kiina on yllätys viimeisten parin kuukauden aikana ennen matkaa. Ja niin luulen, että oli selvää, mitä Radford näki? Mitä hänellä oli? Mitä hän olisi voinut vuotaa Andersonille? Mitä on julkaistu? Mitä julkaistaan? And so I feel they’re asking one million questions as a result of they’re making an attempt desperately to get information about what occurred and what ought to we anticipate next?
Jonathan Movroydis: Let’s pay attention to another tape from the similar dialog. That is Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and the Lawyer Basic John Mitchell, as properly. And this type of provides to the intrigue of the Yeoman Radford affair.
John Ehrlichman: It is all written up, in memo type. And he has entry to the whole lot out of State, the Pentagon, NSC, everyplace. And he simply Xeroxed it and turned it over to Anderson. There’s no query. Now, as I say, we started off on Anderson.
President Nixon: Right.
John Ehrlichman: We have been slowed down by the incontrovertible fact that this man is obviously extremely popular. Then we acquired this Joint Chiefs angle, and so we’ve shut the entire factor down. The guy is clearly cooperative. We’ve had him standing by at house for further interrogation. We then, I feel we now have him tapped. Do we now have him tapped?
John Mitchell: No, we do not.
John Ehrlichman: We don’t have him tapped.
H.R. Haldeman: Can’t you set him underneath some variety of arrest?
John Ehrlichman: Properly, we might—
John Mitchell: We might, however that’s not the point.
John Ehrlichman: This can be a little bit like making an attempt to catch a skunk. And, you might get some on you in the event you [unclear].
President Nixon: You’re right. Precisely proper about this point.
John Ehrlichman: The Joint Chiefs’ liaison workplace is over right here in the EOB, and it’s right in the NSC complicated. It’s very good. It’s Captain Robinson, who, Dave acquired to know on the first day Dave came to work, and stated: “Now, Dave, we’re really your eyes and ears in the Pentagon. You can trust me entirely. My job is to get you fellows information out of the Pentagon.” It turned out to be, in effect, a reverse agent. Working for the Pentagon inside right here. That office, it appears to me, constitutes a transparent and present hazard to the, since [unclear] in the NSC. John has options as to how one can proceed on this that I feel are very sound, and I’ll depart him to elucidate them.
John Mitchell: Properly, Mr. President, I’d wish to point out that this thing goes right into the Joint Chiefs of Employees. Undoubtedly they’d know if it has participated on this ill-gotten features they acquired.
President Nixon: Positive.
John Mitchell: The very first thing you’re—
Richard Nixon: Prosecuting is a risk for the Joint Chiefs. Now, I’ve to consider it.
John Mitchell: I agree with you, but we’ve to take it from there as to what this might result in for those who pursued it by approach of prosecution of Moorer, or, even a public confrontation. You’d have the Joint Chiefs aligned on that aspect immediately towards you. And the, what has been completed has been carried out. I feel that the necessary factor is to paper this factor over.
President Nixon: Yeah.
John Mitchell: This manner, first of all, get that liaison office the hell out of NSC and put it again at the Pentagon.
President Nixon: Right.
John Mitchell: Secondly, to get a security officer into the NSC.
President Nixon: Right. But what about Henry Kissinger?
John Mitchell: Nicely, I feel that whoever goes in there’s going to need to experience herd not only on the relaxation of the employees, however on Henry. It seems that one of these most essential memorandums here that Henry had was lost, and that any person just handed him one other copy. They shouldn’t have even had one other copy. This came out in the papers.
Now, with respect to the Joint Chiefs, you must get, for my part, this guy Admiral Welander the hell out of there, by method of a signal. That approach you possibly can switch him to Kokomo or Indiana, or anyplace we need to have him, along, of course, with this yeoman. And I feel the neatest thing to do is for me, and we’ll depart Laird aside for a moment, but for me to take a seat down with Tom Moorer, and point out what this recreation is that’s been happening.
President Nixon: Um-hmm.
John Mitchell: And it’s the end of the street. The liaison goes back to the Pentagon. If they need him, they will call him over here. And there’s a security quotient going into the NSC, and this ballgame’s over with.
Jonathan Movroydis: Discussed right here is the Joint Chiefs of Employees and a seeming conflict between the civil and army elements of government. What’s alleged right here?
Luke Nichter: Nicely, I imply, through the use of these tapes, we’ve sort of backed into this challenge. The principal instrument of overseas policy making up the White House is the Nationwide Security Council. And sitting on it are representatives of, properly, statutory members but in addition input from numerous businesses that should have enter in overseas coverage. And so what had started underneath, as far as I can monitor back, either the very early Nixon years and even the late Johnson years, LBJ years, is that in the EOB, was an workplace that acted as a liaison between the NSC and the White House on one aspect and the Joint Chiefs on the other.
And so that is the workplace in question that’s being mentioned here. And so on this workplace, previously Rembrandt Robinson had ran it and then Admiral Welander ran it, but actually the everyday employees individual was this Yeoman Charles Radford. Somebody who’s a Yeoman is probably of their no later than late 20s. I mean, someone who’s very young, very junior, however has access of somebody who’s extraordinarily senior, in a sense, much more entry than Tom Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Employees, then Mel Laird, the Secretary of Defense.
And so in this liaison workplace, you recognize, Radford has principally labored himself into a state of affairs where he is a sort of bottleneck for visitors going from the Joint Chiefs, to the White House, and back variety of via his office into the NSC. And so Radford is seeing rather a lot of the paper that comes out of the NSC. And on prime of that, as a result of he’s cleared to see it, and he’s one of the few cleared to see it, he’s additionally been happening trips with Al Haig, with Kissinger, related to Vietnam. The concern is whether it’s been China. However he’s gone on so much and he’s been a notice taker, he’s been a stenographer, he’s been someone who varieties up documents on the aircraft, and he’s gone rather a lot. He’s had really uncommon access at a high-level on rather a lot of subjects.
And so what’s allegedly happening is that he is not solely giving some of these paperwork, which had been purloined or to make use of a more uncooked time period, stolen in some instances. He’s not solely giving some of them to Jack Anderson, and they’re being revealed not directly, highly categorized data, but that he’s also variety of chopping in the chiefs on the operation. As far as I do know, at the least some of these data ended up back in the office of JCS Chairman Moorer who, so far as I do know, didn’t make any copies, but he did read some of them and then returned them because he didn’t need to have copies in his personal protected and for that to be discovered. And so these papers, these White House papers, are going all types of locations. And clearly, there’s a serious safety drawback.
Jonathan Movroydis: Why would Radford need to give this type of info to Moorer?
Luke Nichter: That, I feel, multi-faceted. I mean, if one buys into the argument that Radford is sympathetic to India, then a motive could possibly be that he doesn’t agree with the overseas policy that appears to favor Pakistan extra. A second means to take a look at it is, and right here’s I feel a fair greater drawback that makes this extra than just one other leak story. This is extra than just somebody giving unauthorized access to categorised info that results in the press.
That is where the story, I feel, takes on a most original and far more difficult angle that whether or not the JCS, or the Pentagon, or the DOD, is actually using this entry, this unauthorized entry, that Radford’s given them, to in impact variety of spy on the White House, whether or not it’s variety of learning proposals for troop movements to or from Vietnam, and Nixon had began pulling troops out of Vietnam in the summer time of ‘69, and would have basically all of them out within a matter of months, or whether it would be to pick up inferences on where U.S.-China policy might be leading, you can imagine what an agency like the Pentagon could learn by picking up records of conversations, meetings that are not public. They could learn a tremendous amount through this channel and so, obviously, they would have a reason to keep it going for as long as they could. So I think there’s a mess of motives happening here.
Jonathan Movroydis: Was the army kind of aligned with the policy that was being made in the White House? Lots I perceive was secret, however have been they kind of aligned with what the president needed to do?
Luke Nichter: Properly, I feel that is dependent upon the challenge. I feel rather a lot of individuals in the army have been very, very involved that Nixon was making French pals with communists in China. I feel a quantity of army officers who believed and didn’t need to depart Vietnam, who believed Vietnam was value preventing for, and a minority of them believed that Vietnam might one way or the other be gained militarily, would have had a problem with pulling troops out and pulling troops out principally unilaterally on Nixon’s part. Getting one thing for them along the approach, not totally unilaterally, but clearly the U.S. was gonna get out a method or the different no matter what we obtained in return for every withdrawal of troops.
So I feel that on the entire, army officials have been on board, but there have been differences. And on prime of that, the Pentagon is a sophisticated agency. It all the time has been. The thought of you’ve gotten variety of a civilian leader over army leaders is a very difficult factor to manage. And I feel lots of White Houses wrestle to get that stability proper. You’ve obtained, you recognize, a longtime pal of Nixon’s, Mel Laird, as Secretary of Protection. You’ve acquired very strongly held views of a number of the chiefs and other senior army figures. I don’t even assume it’s attainable to say that there’s, like, one army view about any insurance policies, let alone all of the totally different sides of Nixon overseas policy right now.
Jonathan Movroydis: This administration, the Nixon Administration, takes a tough stance on leaks by government officers. We see at the moment the authorities prosecuting leakers aggressively, Edward Snowden, Actuality Winner, Chelsea Manning. Nixon talks here about prosecuting Admiral Moorer. Why didn’t they finally determine to not prosecute Yeoman Radford and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Employees?
Luke Nichter: To me, there’s no smoking gun that answers that question. I feel the last audio clip or the last phase we played the place Lawyer Common John Mitchell, again, sort of like Ehrlichman, type of is appearing, is sort of taking his Lawyer Common’s head off and appearing in a way as kinda Nixon’s lawyer. In fact, they have been regulation companions together previous to the White House years in New York Metropolis in the 1960s.
And I feel Nixon, for the most half, takes the advice he’s provided that the injury has already been carried out. We will’t get that back. We will put Jack Anderson on discover. We will shut down this liaison workplace. And the memorable line for Mitchell is, “We can transfer Yeoman Radford to Kokomo, Indiana or someplace.” And anybody who’s pushed by means of the center of Indiana and seen the truck stops in Kokomo can imagine what it might be wish to have this new task there after being in Washington.
And I feel finally, Nixon’s assumption should have been that to the extent that the Chiefs have been complicit…and they have been definitely at the least to a level. I don’t know if we all know to what full extent they have been, that probably by not starting a struggle or the conflict that may be needed to prosecute individuals, including prosecuting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Think about this. This is the White House that has already been to high-level courtroom battles once this yr in ’71 over the leaks related to the Pentagon papers, and the freedom of the press issues that went all the approach the Supreme Courtroom.
I feel this can be a John Mitchell who’s far more cautious. And the cautious recommendation he’s giving to Nixon is, “For those who maintain these individuals right where they’re at, you transfer Radford out, you switch Welander out, you allow more proper the place he’s at that going ahead, he’ll in all probability be on his greatest conduct because now, he knows what you already know. “And I feel that’s finally the advice that Nixon took.
Jonathan Movroydis: Our visitor at the moment is Luke Nichter, professor of historical past at Texas A&M College, Central Texas. Our matter was the Nixon White House taping system because it pertains to President Nixon’s conversations about the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1971, and the worldwide and domestic implications of US coverage in that battle. Luke, thanks a lot for becoming a member of us.
Luke Nichter: Thank you.
Jonathan Movroydis: Please examine again for future podcasts at nixonfoundation.org or on iTunes, Sticher, and SoundCloud. That is Jonathan Movroydis in Yorba Linda.
Dialog Oval 553-003. 2 August 1971. 9:20am-9:50am. Nixon, Richard; Kissinger, Henry.
Conversation EOB 307-027. eight December 1971. 4:20pm-5:01pm. Kissinger, Henry; Mitchell, John; Nixon, Richard.
Conversation Oval 639-030. 2 December 1971. 6:07pm-6:59pm. Ehrlichman, John; Haldeman, H.R.; Mitchell, John; Nixon, Richard.